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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes an ensemble learning model that is resistant
to adversarial learning attacks. To build resilience, we proposed a
training process where each member learns a radically different
latent space. Member models are added one at a time to the ensem-
ble. Each model is trained on data set to improve accuracy, while
the loss function is regulated by a reverse knowledge distillation,
forcing the new member to learn new features and map to a latent
space safely distanced from those of existing members. We have
evaluated the reliability and performance of the proposed solution
on image classification tasks using CIFAR10 and MNIST datasets
and show improved performance compared to the state of the art
defense methods
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, the research on Neuromorphic-inspired comput-
ing models, and the applications of Deep Neural Networks (DNN)
for estimation of hard-to-compute functions, or learning of hard-
to-program tasks has significantly grown and their accuracy has
considerably improved. Research on learning models was first to
focus on improving the accuracy of the models [13, 17], but then
as models matured, researchers explored other dimensions, such as
energy efficiency of the models [26, 27, 34] and underlying hard-
ware [8, 23, 24]. The wide adoption of these capable solutions then
started raising concerns over their security.
Among many security aspects of learning solutions, is their
vulnerability to adversarial attacks [12, 37]. Researchers have il-
lustrated that imperceptible, yet targeted adversarial changes to
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the input (i.e. image, audio, or video input) of neural networks can
dramatically drop their performance [19, 29, 30].
The vulnerability of DNNs to adversarial attacks has raised se-
rious concerns for using these models in critical applications in
which an adversary can slightly perturb the input to fool the model
[10, 40]. In this paper, we focus on adversarial attacks on image
classification models where an adversary manipulates an input
image, forcing the DNN to misclassify.
Non-robust features are those features that are strongly associ-
ated within a certain class, yet have small variation across classes
[3, 11]. Ilyas and et al. at [15] showed that the high sensitivity of
the underlying model to the non-robust features existing at the
input dataset is a major reason for the vulnerability of the model
to the adversarial examples. So an adversary crafts a perturbation
that accentuates the non-robust features to achieve a successful
adversarial attack.
From this discussion, a means of building robust classifiers is
identifying robust features and training a model using only robust
features (that have a large intra-class variation), making it harder
for an adversary to mislead the classifier, [15]. Motivated by this
discussion, we proposed a simple yet effectivemethod for improving
the resilience of DNNs, by introducing auxiliary model(s) trained in
the spirit of knowledge distillation, while forcing diversity across
features formed in their latent spaces.
We argue that the reasonwhy adversarial attacks are transferable
across models is that they learn similar latent spaces for non-robust
features. This is either the result of using the 1) same training set
or 2) the use of knowledge distillation while solely focusing on
improving the classification accuracy. In other words, for sharing
the dataset or the knowledge of a trained network (on a dataset),
the potential vulnerabilities of models coincide. Hence, an attack
that works on one model is very likely to work on the other(s). This
conclusion is also supported by the observations by Ilyas and et
al. at [15]. From this argument, we propose to augment the task of
knowledge distillation with an additional and explicit requirement
that the learned features by the student (i.e. auxiliary) model(s)
should be distinct and independent from the teacher (i.e. main)
model. For this reason, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we introduce the
concept of Latent Space Separation (LSS), forcing the auxiliary
model to learn features with little or no correlation to those of the
teacher’s. Hence, an adversarial attack on the main model will have
minimal impact on the latent representation of features learned by
the auxiliary model(s).
2 PRIORWORK
Prior research on adversarial learning has produced different expla-
nations on why leaning models could be easily fooled by adversarial
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Figure 1: In our proposed solutions, we train an auxiliary
model(s) that tracks the main model’s classification while
learning a diverse set of features, latent representation of
which maps to space far apart from the teacher’s. Blue dots
show the latent space of the main model, and the red dots
show the latent space of the auxiliary model. L jM⊥ A in-
dicates the diversity between the jth feature space of the
modelM and A which are L jM and L
j
A , respectively.
input perturbation. The early research blamed the non-linearity
of neural networks for their vulnerability [4, 12]. However, this
perception was later challenged by Goodfellow and et. al. [12],
who developed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM), explaining
how neural network linearity can be exploited for rapidly building
adversarial examples.
Building robust learning models that could resist adversarial
examples has been a topic of interest for many researchers. Some
of the most notable prior art on this topic includes 1) Adversarial
Training [35][1], 2) Knowledge Distillation (KD) [14], and 3) de-
noising and refinement of the adversarial examples [22].
Adversarial Training: It is the process of incremental training
of a model with the known adversarial examples to improve its
resilience. The problem with this approach is that the model’s
resilience only improves when the model is attacked with similarly
generated adversarial examples [38, 39].
Knowledge Distillation (KD): In this method, a compact (stu-
dent) model learns to follow the behavior of one or more teacher
models. It was originally introduced as a means of building compact
models (students) from more accurate yet larger models (teachers).
But, later it was also used for diminishing the sensitivity of the
student’s output model concerning the input’s perturbations [28].
However, the work in [5] illustrated that if the attacker has access
to the student model, with minor changes, the student model could
be as vulnerable as the teacher. Specifically, knowledge distillation
can be categorized as a gradient masking defense [2] in which
the magnitude of the underlying model’s gradients are reduced to
minimize the effect of changes in the model’s input to its output.
Although grading masking defenses can be effective defense against
white-box attacks, they are not resistant against black-box evasion
attacks [5]. Our proposed solution is motivated by KD, however,
we do not force the auxiliary (i.e. student) network(s) to follow the
output layers of the main network (i.e. teacher); In contrary to the
KD, the auxiliary network has to learn a different latent space while
being trained for the same task and on the same dataset.
Refining the Input Image: The adversarial defenses that rely
on refining the input samples try to denoise the input image us-
ing some sort of autoencoder (variational, denoising, etc.) [7]. In
this approach, the image is first encoded using a deep network to
extract a latent code (a lossy, compressed, yet reconstructable rep-
resentation of the input image) and then the image is reconstructed
using a decoder. Then the decoded image is fed to the classifier
[7]. However, this approach suffers from two main weaknesses: (1)
The reconstruction error of decoder can significantly reduce the
classifier’s accuracy and such reconstruction error increases as the
number of input classes increases; (2) the used encoder-network
is itself vulnerable to adversarial attacks which mean new adver-
sarial examples can be crafted on the model which also include the
encoder-network.
3 PROPOSED METHOD
Our objective is to formulate a knowledge distillation process in
which one or more auxiliary (student) models Ai are trained to
closely follow the prediction of a main (teacher) modelM, while
being forced to learn substantially different latent spaces. For exam-
ple in Fig. 2, let’s assume three auxiliary models A1, A2, A3 have
been trained alongside the main modelM to have the maximum
diversity between their latent space representations. Our desired
outcome is to assure that an adversarial perturbation that could
move the latent space of the input sample x out of its correspond-
ing class boundary, SML , has a negligible or small impact on the
movement of the corresponding latent space of x in the class bound-
aries of the auxiliary models A1, A2, A3. Hence, an adversarial
input that could fool modelM, becomes less effective or ineffective
on the auxiliary models. This objective is reached by the way the
loss function of each model is defined. The details ofM and Ai
network(s), learning procedure and objective function of Ai are
explained next:
Figure 2: SML : latent space of the main model, S
A1
L , S
A2
L ,
SA3L : latent spaces of the auxiliary models 1, 2, and 3. x is
an input sample and the red arrow at the mainmodel shows
the direction of the adversarial perturbation, the red arrows
for the auxiliary models show the projection of the pertur-
bation on the latent spaces of the auxiliary model.
Main Model (M:) In this paper, we evaluated our proposed
method on two datasets MNIST [20] and CIFAR10 [16]. So depend-
ing on the underlying dataset, the structure of the main model
(teacher)M is selected as showed in Table 1. We also employed
cross-entropy loss C, see Eq. 1, as the objective function for training
the modelM.
LM = C(Y , M(X )) = −
i=N∑
i=1
Yi log(M(Xi )) (1)
In this equation, Xi and Yi are ith training sample and its label, respec-
tively.
AuxiliaryModel (A): Each auxiliary model is a structural replica of the
main model M. However, model A is trained using a modified KD training
process: let’s denote the output of jth layer of model A (i.e. latent space of
model A) and M by F jA and F
j
M respectively. Our training objective is to
force model A to learn very different latent space compared to M when
both do the same classification task on the same dataset. To achieve this,
the term L jM⊥A which shows the similarity of the jth layer of model A to
jth layer of model M is defined as follows:
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L jM⊥A =
F(X )jM . F(X )
j
A
|F(X )jM | |F(X )
j
A |
, X ∈ T (2)
In this objective function, T is the dataset, and the (.) is the inner product
function. This similarity measure then is factored in to define the loss func-
tion (LA ) for the training the model A, which increases the dissimilarity
of the layer j of the model A with respect to the M:
LA = (1 − ζ )LC(Y , A(X ))︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
tarдet the accuracy
+ ζ L jM⊥A︸     ︷︷     ︸
tarдet the diversity
(3)
In this equation, ζ is a regularization parameter to control the contribu-
tion of each term.
Let’s assume the adversarial perturbation δ , when added to the input X ,
forces the modelM to misclassifyX , or more preciselyM(X +δ ) , M(X ).
For this misclassification (evasion) to happen, in a layer j (close to the output)
the added noise has forced some of the class-identifying features outside its
related class boundary learned by model M. However, the class boundaries
learned by A and M are quite different. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 2,
although noise δ can move a feature out of its learned class boundary in
model M, it has very limited power in displacing the features learned by
model A outside of its class boundary in layer j . In other words, although
the term F(X )jM . F(X )
j
A between the main and the auxiliary models has
a low value, the term F(X + δ )jA . F(X )
j
A between the auxiliary model
before and after adding perturbation δ has a high value, subsequently the
student model A has a low sensitivity to the perturbation δ , meaning
A(X + δ ) = A(X ).
3.1 Black and White-Box defense:
The auxiliary models could be used to defend against both white and black
box defenses, description and explanation for each are given next:
Black-box Defense: In the black box attack, an attacker has access
to model M, and can apply her desired input to the model and monitor
the model’s prediction for designing an attack and adding the adversarial
perturbation to the input X . Considering no access to the model A, and
for having very different feature space, the model A remains resistant to
black-box attacks and using a single A is sufficient.
White-box Defense: In the white-box attack, the attacker knows every-
thing about the model M and A, including model parameters and weights,
full details of each model’s architecture, and the dataset used for training
the network. For this reason, using a single model A is not enough, as that
model could be used for designing the attack. However, we can make the
attack significantly more difficult (and also improve the classification confi-
dence) by training and using multiple robust auxiliary models. However,
each of our A models learns different features compared with all other
auxiliary models. Then, to resist the white-box attack, we create a majority
voting system from the robust auxiliary models.
Let’s assume we want to train k > 1 auxiliary models, Ai=ki=1 , each
having a diverse latent space (i.e. M ⊥ A1 ⊥ A2 ⊥ · · · ⊥ Ak ). To learn
these networks, firstly, based on 3, the A1 is learned aiming M ⊥ A1.
Then, the A2 is learned to be diverse of both A1 and M. This process
continues one by one, reaching the Ai model, that its latent space is diverse
from all previous models (i.e. Ai ⊥ {M, Ai=i−1i=1 }). According to this
discussion for learning the ith auxiliary model, the loss function is defined
as:
LA = (1− ζ )LC(Y , Ai (X ))+ (ζ /i)LiM⊥Ai + (ζ /i)
y=i−1∑
j=1
L jAy⊥Ai (4)
Finally, to increase the confidence of the prediction, instead of a simple
majority voting system for the top-1 candidate, we consider a boosted
defense in which the voting system considers the top n candidates of each
model A for those cases that majority on top-1 fails (there is no majority
between the top-1 predictions). This gives us two benefits 1) if a network
misclassify due to adversarial perturbation, there is still a high chance for
Table 1: The Architecture of each one the ensemble models
MNIST Architecture CIFAR10 Architecture
Relu Convolutional 32 filters (3×3) Relu Convolutional 96 filters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 32 filters (3×3) Relu Convolutional 96 filters (3×3)
Max Pooling 2×2 Relu Convolutional 96 filters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 64 filters (3×3) Max Pooling 2×2
Relu Convolutional 64 filters (3×3) Relu Convolutional 192 filters (3×3)
Max Pooling 2×2 Relu Convolutional 192 filters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 200 units Relu Convolutional 192 filters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 200 units Max Pooling 2×2
Softmax 10 units Relu Convolutional 192 filters (3×3)
Relu Convolutional 192 filters (1×1)
Relu Convolutional 192 filters (1×1)
Global Avg. Pooling
Softmax 10 units
System Configuration and training hyper parameters
OS: Red Hat 7.7, Pytorch: 1.3, FoolBox: 2.3.0, GPU: Nvidia Tesla V100, EPOCH: 100,
MNIST Batch Size: 64, CIFAR10 Batch Size:128, Optimizer: ADAM, learning rate:
1e-4
the network to assign a high probability (but not the highest) to the correct
class. 2) if a model is confused between a correct class and a closely related
but incorrect class and assign the top-1 confidence to the incorrect class, it
still helps in identifying the correct class in the voting system.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed defense against
various white and black-box attacks. All models are trained using Pytorch
framework[31], and all attack scenarios are implemented using Foolbox[32]
(which is a toolbox for crafting various adversarial examples). The details
of the hyperparameters and system configuration are shown in Table 1.
4.1 Latent Space Separation
To quantify the diversity of the latent space representations of the ensemble
trained on a dataset D , we first define the Latent Space Separation (LSS)
measure between latent spaces of two models A1 and A2 as:
LSSD (SA1L , S
A2
L ) =
2
∥W ∥ . (5)
In which SA1L , S
A2
L are latent space representations of the dataset D for
models A1 and A2, respectively.W is the normal vector of the hyperplane
obtained by Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier[9] for linearly separate
the latent spaces obtained on the datasetD . More precisely, LSS between two
latent spaces is obtained by following these 4 steps: 1) training both models
A1,A2 on a dataset i.e., MNIST. 2) generating the latent space of eachmodel
on the evaluation set i.e., SA1L and S
A2
L . 3) tuning the latent representations
into a two-class classification problem tackled by SVM classifier 4) using
SVM margin as LSS distance between two latent representations of the
dataset MNIST, LSSMN IST (SA1L , S
A2
L ). This process has been shown in
Fig. 4. Note that the SVM classifier should be set in the hard margin mode,
meaning no support vector is allowed to pass the margins. When the SVM
classification fails, it means that the latent spaces were not linearly separable
i.e., there is either an overlap between latent spaces or the decision boundary
cannot be modeled linearly. So in both cases, the more the marginal distance
between latent spaces are the higher is the diversity of formed latent spaces.
Using Eq. 5, we define more generalized formula of LSS using an en-
semble model comprised of N models, see Eq. 6. In fact the total LSS of an
ensemble model is obtained by averaging the LSS of each model latent space
versus all other models’. For instance, Let’s imagine the ensemble model
comprised of threemodelsA1,A2, andA3. Then the total LSS is calculated by
1/3(LSSD (SA1L , (S
A2
L , S
A3
L )) + LSSD (S
A2
L , (S
A1
L , S
A3
L )) + LSSD (S
A3
L , (S
A1
L , S
A2
L ))).
LSS measures the marginal distance of SVM in a two-class-classification
task, so LSSD (A1, (A2, A3)), indicates that a SVM classification has been
performed between the latent space of the model A1 and an aggregation of
latent spaces of other two models A2 and A3.
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Figure 3: training method of the DKD (left), KD (middle), and RI (right). KL-Divergence [18] and Cross-Entropy [21] are the
objective functions that have been used for obtaining the total loss. Cosine-Similarity and Cross-Entropy are the ones used to
obtain loss function related to DKD. For the RI only the Cross-Entropy is used.
Figure 4: The hypothetical representation of latent spaces of
two models A1 and A2 is shown on top. The bottom figure
shows the LSSD (SA1L ,S
A2
L ) between these two latent spaces
obtained by SVM.
1
N
N∑
i=1
LSSD (SAiL , (S
A1
L , ..., S
Ai−1
L , S
Ai+1
L , ..., S
AN
L )). (6)
Table 2: The number of failed majority between an ensem-
ble of the three models at the original and boosted version,
indicated with *, of KD, DKD, and RI on the datasets MNIST
and CIFAR10. The accuracy improvement using the boosted
version is shown with Accuracy Improved (A.I). We investi-
gated our proposed method against well-know attacks like
DeepFool [25], C&W [6], JSMA [30], and FGSM [12].
Param. MNIST CIFAR10KD KD* DKD DKD* RI RI* KD KD* DKD DKD* RI RI*
Deep Fool Deep Fool
1 4 0 15 0 16 0 576 6 1234 51 891 33
200 7 1 93 0 61 0 628 5 1319 52 959 32
A.I.(%) 0.02 0.12 0.35 1.36 2.88 7.16
C&W C&W
1 188 3 172 0 225 6 584 1 1201 2 859 13
200 560 5 794 2 921 16 630 2 1322 2 942 12
A.I.(%) 0.01 0.33 0.22 13.97 1.47 2.79
JSMA JSMA
1 0 0 15 0 16 6 584 8 1201 51 859 31
200 4 1 52 0 42 8 654 8 1410 56 999 35
A.I.(%) 0.01 0.26 0.15 1.39 2.94 4.18
FGSM FGSM
0.04 190 5 342 16 235 20 821 3 1801 106 1560 66
0.08 239 6 589 27 349 34 924 9 1842 71 1872 77
0.1 349 3 844 36 504 46 950 12 1829 79 2053 105
A.I.(%) 0.03 0.21 0.12 1.33 3.74 2.94
To investigate the effectiveness of LSS, as a metric for measuring the
diversity between different latent spaces, we considered three different
scenarios for training an ensemble of 3 models with the same structure: I)
Random Initialization (RI) where 3 models trained independently with a
random initial value, see Fig. 3-right. II) Knowledge Distillation (KD), where
3 models trained collaboratively as shown in Fig. 3-middle, III) Diversity
Knowledge Distillation (DKD), where 3 models are trained in a collaborative
yet different manner of KD, see Fig. 3-left. Note that KD and RI methods deal
with the softmax probabilities, shown with red boxes, however, DKD uses a
mix of softmax and the latent spaces, showed with black straps. Alongside
each one of the designs DKD, KD, and RI, a boosted version of each one
is implemented and denoted by DKD∗, KD∗, and RI ∗, respectively. Both
KD and DKD are trained in a one-by-one manner, meaning the ith model
considers the i − 1 previously trained models at its training phase while
those i −1models are frozen i.e., their parameters (weights) are not updated
while the ith model is being trained.
Figure 5: (A), (B) show the LSS of an ensemble of three mod-
els on the MNIST, and CIFAR10 datasets. (C), (D) show the
classification accuracy of the ensemblemodel on theMNIST,
and CIFAR10 datasets. In this figure three method Random
Initialization(RI), Knowlege Distillation (KD), and Diversity
Knowledge Distillation(DKD) are shown.
Fig. 5-top shows the LSS for an ensemble of three models (for MNIST
and CIFAR10 datasets), with the structures described in Table. 1. Fig. 5-A
and C show that for the MNIST dataset, increasing the value of the ζ causes
1) rapid increase at the LSS 2) slight drop at the classification accuracy.
Considering the equation 4, increasing the ζ means putting less emphasis
on the cross-entropy term which reflects the slight drop of accuracy and
increases the LSS of the latent spaces of the ensemble models. A similar
pattern happens for the CIFAR10 dataset, Fig. 5-B and D, in which LSS
increases to its maximum at the ζ = 0.5 while the classification accuracy
slightly increases. Between all the different values of acceptable accuracies,
the ζ value which leads to a higher LSS is selected as the parameter. In
other words, to have a diverse latent space, the LSS between them should be
maximized while the accuracy is kept in the acceptable range. For example
in Fig. 5-B, when ζ is 0.5, the LSS is at the maximum level while accuracy
is also at an acceptable level. Accordingly, the following attacks have been
performed when the parameters ζ is set to 0.5 and 0.9 for the CIFAR10 and
MNIST datasets.
One instant observation in Fig. 5 is that the LSS between the latent
spaces obtained by DKD approach is noticeably larger than RI, and the
LSS between latent spaces obtained by RI is slightly larger than KD. This
observation is aligned with our expectations because the DKD is designed
to increase the diversity between the latent spaces while the KD in essence,
increases the similarity between models and this is because the student
model(s) imitates the behavior of the teacher(s).
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Table 3: Black Box adversarial attack on an ensemble of three models on the MNIST and CIFAR10 dataset. At each row the
bold number shows the most resistant defense mechanism.
MNIST CIFAR10
Param. 3 Ensemble Models Ref. Param. 3 Ensemble Models Ref.KD KD* DKD DKD* RI RI* KD KD* DKD DKD* RI RI*
DeepFool[25] DeepFool
1 0.9510 0.9542 0.9721 0.9726 0.962 0.9682 0.9754 1 0.8355 0.8475 0.92 0.9463 0.8596 0.92 0.6505
200 0.864 0.8642 0.8904 0.8916 0.8433 0.8768 0.5835 200 0.7972 0.8108 0.8981 0.9269 0.8265 0.8981 0.1586
C&W[6] C&W
1 0.9612 0.9614 0.988 0.9882 0.9721 0.9726 0.9841 1 0.8475 0.959 0.9534 0.9575 0.9326 0.9571 0.9516
200 0.7829 0.783 0.8587 0.862 0.8127 0.8149 0.2 200 0.8014 0.9311 0.9245 0.9321 0.9022 0.9301 0.1543
JSMA[30] JSMA
1 0.9612 0.9614 0.9882 0.9884 0.9721 0.9726 0.9854 1 0.8475 0.8599 0.9326 0.9571 0.8348 0.8703 0.9516
200 0.8147 0.8148 0.9086 0.9112 0.8403 0.8418 0.4322 200 0.7804 0.7943 0.8851 0.9145 0.7644 0.8062 0.1564
FGSM[12] FGSM
0.04 0.9553 0.9555 0.9842 0.9846 0.9638 0.9644 0.952 0.04 0.8412 0.8548 0.899 0.933 0.8296 0.8676 0.4822
0.08 0.9247 0.9249 0.9619 0.9629 0.9333 0.9341 0.864 0.08 0.08 0.7476 0.7615 0.7393 0.7763 0.7267 0.7627 0.2534
0.1 0.8937 0.894 0.9374 0.9395 0.9059 0.9071 0.7847 0.1 0.6998 0.7131 0.6839 0.7213 0.6817 0.7111 0.0867
No Attack No Attack
- 0.9612 0.9614 0.9882 0.9884 0.9721 0.9726 0.9854 - 0.9501 0.9512 0.9561 0.9580 0.9385 0.9523 0.9607
Table 4: white box attack on the ensemble of threemodels on theMNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. Bold numbers at each columns
shows the most resistant method against white box attacks.
MNIST CIFAR10
Defense Clean FGSM 0.04 FGSM 0.08 JSMA C&W DeepFool Clean FGSM 0.04 FGSM 0.08 JSMA C&W DeepFool
No Defense 0.9661 0.9171 0.8249 0.2421 0.4409 0.0 0.9304 0.2033 0.1846 0.2525 0.2548 0.1441
DKD*standalone 0.9884 0.9835 0.9681 0.8849 0.9594 0.8991 0.9604 0.7377 0.7188 0.7788 0.8878 0.7934
DKD*aддr eдate 0.9884 0.9756 0.9329 0.9725 0.9808 0.9605 0.9604 0.8923 0.8623 0.9221 0.9538 0.8751
MagNet[22] 0.9031 0.6519 0.6141 0.8014 0.4821 0.6518 0.9421 0.7881 0.7041 0.8134 0.7743 0.7679
Pixel Defend[36] 0.8266 0.7335 0.6711 0.9191 0.7560 0.7394 0.9491 0.7094 0.6911 0.8411 0.8101 0.7816
Defense GAN [33] 0.9640 0.9450 0.8221 0.9465 0.8012 0.7921 0.9219 0.7551 0.7101 0.8712 0.8020 0.7651
4.2 Black-Box Attacks
For launching a black-box attack, the adversary uses a reference model and
trains it based on the available dataset. Then knowing the transferability
of the adversarial example, the adversary extracts the adversarial example
on the reference model and applies it to the models under attack. Assume
the adversary used LENET and VGG16 as the reference model for MNIST
and CIFAR10 respectively, and the underlying models under attack are an
ensemble of three models with the structure which has been shown at Table
1. For investigating the performance of the proposed method (DKD) on
black-box attacks, we also considered two other methods RI, and KD for
training an ensemble of three models.
We used the majority voting between the ensemble models, however,
in some cases, each one of the models results in a different prediction
regards to other models, we refer to these cases as failed majorities. So for
each one of the available attacks and two datasets (MNIST and CIFAR10)
we counted the number of failed majorities. Table 2, shows the difference
between the regular and boosted version of each benchmark in regards to
the number of the failed majority voting. From this table, we observed that
1) the number of majority voting failures at the DKD is always higher than
the other two regular methods. This confirms that our objective function
could successfully train diverse models because the majority voting fails
whenever the models couldn’t agree on a label. So at the presence of the
adversarial example the disagreement between the models which trained
with DKD is higher than the others 2) The number of majority failures drop
by going from a regular to a boosted model. The effect of this drop on the
accuracy is shown by Accuracy Improvement percentage, A.I.
Table 3 show the result of applying some of the state-of-art attacks on the
DKD, KD, and RI on the MNIST, and CIFAR10 datasets. Investigating these
two Tables two trends reveals 1) Boosted version has better performance
than the regular version 2) Almost at all attack scenarios,DKD∗ outperform
the other defense scenarios.
4.3 White-Box Attacks
We considered two different white-box scenarios 1) Standalone attack, in
which the adversary can only apply the adversarial perturbation to one
model at a time. 2) The Aggregated attack, in which the adversary can apply
Figure 6: Decision boundary of two hypothetical models.
Plane A and B are the demonstrations of two input space
of the first and second models respectively. Single attacks
represent the scenarios when the adversary attacks a single
model at a time and applies the adversarial perturbation to
the other model, whereas at the Aggregated attacks the ad-
versary attacks both models simultaneously.
the adversarial perturbation to both models simultaneously. These two
scenarios have been explained through a toy example on two models A and
B in Fig. 6. For the standalone attack, the adversary finds the direction τB as
an adversarial perturbation on the model B. In the second step, the adversary
applies the same perturbation τB on the samples of the model A, with the
hope that those adversarial perturbations could be transferred to model
A. In the forward pass of the model A, the following equation which is a
simplification of the model A function is happeningA′ = φ(A)∗(X +τB ). So
based on the angle between the latent spaces of the models A and B, based
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on. Fig. 6, three scenarios are possible, each of which represent a different
hypothetical angle between plane A′, and B′. When both latent spaces A′
and B′ are orthogonal (case I), a successful adversarial perturbation of one
model does not transfer to the other model (causes no perturbation), and vice
versa. Hence, a disagreement between these two models can be an indicator
of an adversarial example. In two other cases (II, III), the smaller the angle
between the latent spaces, the more probable is that the transferrability
of adversarial perturbation across models. Note that the projection of the
vector τB on the plane A′, φ(A) ∗ τB , shows the direction of the adversarial
perturbation for the model A. If this projection is large enough to move the
data point Y out of its class boundary then input X misclassifies as X ∗∗ .
For the aggregated attack, the adversary obtains the adversarial pertur-
bation of both latent spaces A and B separately and independently. Then
the adversary selects the direction of the sum τA + τB as the adversarial di-
rection, in which by changing the magnitude of the vector on that direction
the adversary successfully obtains an adversarial perturbation which can be
applied on both the models. In this scenario let’s assume τA , and τB are the
perturbation vectors at the plane A and B respectively, in which led to an
imperceptible adversarial example, and also θ and β are the angles between
these two vectors and sum of these two vectors, respectively. Based on the
value of θ between τA and τB , three different outcomes can be assumed,
1) Fig.6 Aggregated-II, θ > 90, in which the projection of β on each vec-
tor τA and τB is less than either of them. In this case, β as an adversarial
perturbation cannot be a successful attack on either of the models. 2) Fig.6
Aggregated-I, θ < 90, in which the projection of β on each one of the
individual vectors τA and τB is greater than either of them, which means β
as an adversarial example can be a successful attack. However the resulted
adversarial perturbation in this scenario is large. 3) Fig.6 Aggregated-III,
θ = 90, in which the projection of the β on τA and τB is equal to either of
them, which means β as an adversarial example can successfully move out
the data point X from its class boundary at both planes.
Table 4 captures the result of various adversarial attacks on our proposed
solution. For the FGSM attack, the hyper-parameters 0.1 and 0.3 are reported.
Iterative attacks are executed for 200 iterations. DKD∗standalone shows
the evaluation of DKD* when the adversary uses the standalone attack,
and DKD∗aддr eдated shows the aggregated attack. As indicated in this
table, our proposed solutions outperform prior art defense, illustrating the
effectiveness of learning diverse features using our proposed solution.
5 CONCLUSION
To build robust models that could resist adversarial attacks, we proposed a
method for increasing the diversity between the latent space representa-
tions of models used within an ensemble. We also introduced Latent Space
Separation (distance between the latent space representations of models in
the ensemble) as a metric for measuring the robustness of the ensemble to
adversarial examples. The evaluation of our proposed solutions against the
white and black box attacks indicates that our proposed ensemble model is
resistant to adversarial solutions and outperforms prior art solutions.
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